One who possesses property and holds himself or herself out as the owner is presumed to be the owner.42 If, however, a person pays the consideration for property yet vests title to that property in an other, the presumption arises that the purchaser is the beneficial owner of the property and that title has been vested in another for incidental reasons.43 In equity, the holder of the legal title in such circumstances is described as holding it in a resulting trust for the beneficial owner.44 Where the consideration is paid by a family member or close relative of the person in whom title is vested, however, the presumption arises that a gift, and not a resulting trust, was intended.45 Thus, when a husband transfers an interest in property that he owns to his wife, either in fee simple absolute or by the entireties, a presumption arises that he intended to make a gift of the interest conferred.46 The same applies where parents transfer an interest in property to their children.46.1
Delaware law presumes that in the sale of stock, the seller sells and assigns all of its rights, title and interest, including its right to grant a consent or a revocation with respect to a past record date. Delaware law further presumes that upon request the seller will, in good faith, take such ministerial steps as are necessary (e.g., granting proxies) to effectuate the transfer.46.2
By statute, all property acquired by either spouse during marriage, regardless of how such property is titled, is presumed to be marital property.47 The party seeking to overcome this presumption has the burden of establishing that either (i) the property was acquired by an individual spouse through bequest, devise or descent; (ii) the property was acquired in exchange for property acquired before marriage; (iii) the property is excluded by valid agreement of the parties; or (iv) the property claimed relates to an increase in the value of property acquired before marriage.48
A voluntary conveyance of property by a debtor without valuable consideration is presumed to be fraudulent as to existing creditors.49 This presumption applies equally (or perhaps more strongly) to voluntary conveyances between blood relatives.50
After twenty years, a rebuttable presumption arises that a judgment has been paid.50.1
42. Maryland Credit Finance Corp. v. Campbell, 195 A. 277, 285 (Del. 1937); State v. Fullman, 74 A. 1, 1-2 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1908); State v. Patton, 41 A. 193, 194 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1894). See also Marvel v. State, 290 A.2d 641, 644 (Del. 1972).
43. Hudak v. Procek, 727 A.2d 841, 843 (Del. 1999); Adams v. Jankouskas, 452 A.2d 148, 152 (Del. 1982); Hanby v. Hanby, 245 A.2d 428, 429 (Del. 1968); Boyd v. Clark, 267 A.2d 473, 475 (Del. Ch. 1970); Greenly v. Greenly, 29 Del. Ch. 297, 49 A.2d 126, 129 (Del. Ch. 1946); Estate of Lyons v. Lyons, C.A. No. 6151, slip op. at 8, Berger, V.C. (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 1986); Wells v. Boardly, C.A. No. 5885, slip op. at 5-7, Longobardi, V.C. (Del. Ch. Sept. 12, 1983).
44. Adams v. Jankouskas, 452 A.2d 148, 152 (Del. 1982); Bullen v. Davies, 209 A.2d 81, 84 (Del. 1965); Newell v. Morgan, 2 Del. 225, 2 Harr. 225, 229-30 (Del. Err. & App. 1837).
45. Hudak v. Procek, 727 A.2d 841, 843 (Del. 1999); McCafferty v. Flinn, 14 Del. Ch. 307, 125 A. 675, 677 (Del. Ch. 1924).
46. Husband G. v. Wife G., 410 A.2d 155, 160 (Del. 1979); Hanby v. Hanby, 245 A.2d 428, 430 (Del. 1968); Marsh v. Marsh, 261 A.2d 540, 542 (Del. Ch. 1970); Owens v. Owens, 143 A.2d 123, 128 (Del. Ch. 1958), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 149 A.2d 320 (Del. 1959); Greenly v. Greenly, 49 A.2d 126, 129 (Del. Ch. 1946); In re the Marriage of Pittaoulis, C.A. No. CN8S-926l, slip op. at 11-12, Wakefield, J. (Del. Fam. Apr. 20, 1990); DiBiase v. DiBiase, C.A. No. 377.87, slip op. at 4.5, Conner, J. (Del. Fam. Feb. 8, 1988).
46.1. Hudak v. Procek, 727 A.2d 841, 843 (Del. 1999).
46.2. Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377, 388 (Del. 2010).
47. 13 Del. C. § 1513(c)
48. 13 Del. C. § 1513(b)(l-4); Gregg v. Gregg, 510 A.2d 474, 478 (Del. 1986); W. v. W., 419 A.2d 934, 935 (Del. 1980) (criticized on other grounds by Lynam v. Gallagher, 526 A.2d 878 (Del. 1987)); Husband G. v. Wife G., 410 A.2d 155, 160 (Del. 1979).
49. Hull v. Hudson, 9 Del. Ch. 205, 80 A. 674, 676-77 (Del. Ch. 1911); Faircloth v. Rash, 373 A.2d 870, 872 (Del. Super. 1977); Krenowsky v. Haining, C.A. No. 7940, slip op. at 19, Jacobs, V.C. (Del. Ch. Nov. 14, 1989), aff’d mem., 567 A.2d 421 (Del. 1989); Justice v. D&R Builders, Inc., C.A. No. 5387, slip op. at 6, Brown, V.C. (Del. Ch. Jan. 18, 1978).
50. Tri-State Vehicle Leasing, Inc. v. Dutton, 461 A.2d 1007, 1008 (Del. 1983).
50.1. Gamles Corp. v. Gibson, 939 A.2d 1269, 1272 (Del. 2007).
© 2010 David L. Finger