Parties have an unqualified right to instructions containing a correct statement of the substantive law.6 Parties are not entitled, however, to require that instructions be in any specific form7 or use specific language,8 nor are parties entitled to require that instructions be given in a particular sequence.9
It is not sufficient for judges merely to instruct the jury as to abstract principles of law. Instead, judges must tailor their instructions to the factual contentions of the parties to provide the jury with a means of reaching a conclusion.10 It is appropriate for the trial judge to state the factual contentions of the parties, provided that the statement is impartial and expresses no opinion as to the correctness of any party’s position11
Judges should give instructions in language that would enable the average layman not acquainted with the technicalities of the law to understand thoroughly both the factual and legal issues arising in the different phases of a particular case.12 Judges are not required to be word perfect, however. Some awkwardness and inaptness is to be expected in any charge. A charge is sufficient if it is reasonably informative and not misleading, judged by the common practice and standards of verbal communication, and does not undermine the jury’s ability to perform its duty intelligently.13 The adequacy of a set of instructions is determined by examining the instructions as a whole. Individual words, phrases or instructions may not be viewed out of context.14 When guilt or liability is predicated upon a statute, the judge must read all pertinent portions of the statute to the jury.15 If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the judge is not required to explain the meaning of such language.16
If the instruction is a correct statement of the law, the fact that a particular word or phrase becomes prominent by frequent repetition does not render the charge prejudicial.17 Conversely, a judge has no obligation to repeat any portion of a charge.18 In cases when parties of different genders are at risk of different degrees of guilt or liability, judges should be careful to use the correct gender pronouns in instructing the jury, to avoid the risk of prejudice by confusing the jury as to each party’s guilt or liability.19
6. Banther v. State, 977 A.2d 870, 883 (Del. 2009); Comer v. State, 977 A.2d 374, 342 (Del. 2009); Claudio v. State, 958 A.2d 846, 851 (Del. 2008); Handler Corp. v. Tiapechco, 901 A.2d 737, 74 (Del. 2006); Green v. St. Francis Hospital, Inc., 791 A.2d 731, 742 (Del. 2002); Russell v. K-Mart Corp., 761 A.2d 1, 5 (Del.2000); McKenzie v. Blasetto, 686 A.2d 160, 163 (Del. 1996); Liu v. State, 628 A.2d 1376, 1386 (Del. 1993); Koutoufaris v. Dick, 604 A.2d 390, 399 (Del. 1992); Sirmans v. Penn, 588 A.2d 1103, 1104 (Del. 1991); Culver v. Bennett, 588 A.2d 1094, 1096 (Del. 1991); Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278, 1282 (Del. 1991); Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719, 724 (Del. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1223 (1991); Dawson v. State, 581 A.2d 1078, 1104 (Del. 1990), vacated on other grounds, remanded, 503 U.S. 159 (1992); Johnson v. State, 550 A.2d 903, 907 (Del. 1988); Sheeran v. State, 526 A.2d 886, 894 (Del. 1987); Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 121 (Del. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983) and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985); Miller v. State, 224 A.2d 592, 596 (Del. 1966). The converse of this is that parties are not entitled to instructions that incorrectly or incompletely state the law. Sheeran v. State, 526 A.2d 886 (Del. 1987); Johnson v. Hockessin Tractor, Inc., 420 A.2d 154, 156 (Del. 1980); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Caster, 216 A.2d 689, 693 (Del. 1966).
7. State v. Clayton, 988 A.2d 935, 936 (Del. 2010); Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278, 1282 (Del. 1991); Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719, 724 (Del. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1223 (1991); Miller v. State, 224 A.2d 592, 596 (Del. 1966).
8. Koutoufaris v. Dick, 604 A.2d 390, 399 (Del. 1992); Sirmans v. Penn, 588 A.2d 1103, 1104 (Del. 1991); Culver v. Bennett, 588 A.2d 1094, 1096 (Del. 1991); Dawson v. State, 581 A.2d 1078, 1104 (Del. 1990), vacated on other grounds, remanded, 503 U.S. 159 (1992); Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104,128 (Del. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983) and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985); Chavin v. Cope. 243 A.2d 694, 698 (Del. 1968); Hutchins v. State, 153 A.2d 204, 209 (Del. 1959); Lord v. Poore, 108 A.2d 366, 371 (Del. 1954); Philadelphia, B. & W. R. Co. v. Buchanan, 78 A. 776, 783-84 (Del. 1911); McFeat v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co., 69 A. 744, 746 (Del. 1908).
9. Franklin v. Salminen, 222 A.2d 261, 263 (Dcl. 1966).
10. Probst v. State, 547 A.2d 114, 120 (Del. 1988); Lutzkovitz v. Murray, 339 A.2d 64, 67 (Del. 1975); Stuart v. Rizzo, 242 A.2d 477, 479 n. 3 (Del. 1968); Beck v. Haley, 239 A.2d 699, 702 (Del. 1968); Wiggins v. State, 210 A.2d 314, 316 (Del. 1965); Bantum v. State, 85 A.2d 741, 752 (Del. 1952); Baker v. Reid, 57 A.2d 103, 109 (Del. 1947); Island Express, Inc. v. Frederick, 171 A. 181, 184 (Del. 1934).
11. Richards v. Richman, 64 A. 238, 240-41 (Del. 1906); Greenplate v. Lowth, 199 A. 659 (Del. Super. 1938).
12. Alber v. Wise, 166 A.2d 141, 143 (Del. 1960); Buckley v. R. H. Johnson & Co., 25 A.2d 392, 397 (Del. Super. 1942).
13. General Motors Corp. v. Grenier, 981 A.2d 531, 431 (Del. 2009); Hilco Capital, LP v. Federal Ins. Co. 978 A.2d 174, 181 (Del. 2009); Sammons v. Doctors for Emergency Services, P.A., 913 A.2d 518, 539 (Del. 2006); Saudi Basic Industries Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co., Inc., 866 A.2d 1, 37 (Del. 2005); Chrysler Corp. v. Chaplake Holdings, Ltd., 822 A.2d 1024, 1034 (Del. 2003); Corbett v. Tatagari, 804 A.2d 1057, 1062 (Del. 2002); Green v. S. Francis Hospital, Inc., 791 A.2d 731, 742 (Del. 2002); McKenzie v, Blasetto, 686 A.2d 160, 163 (Del. 1996); Koutoufaris v. Dick, 604 A.2d 390,399 (Del. 1992); Sirmans v. Penn, 588 A.2d 1103, 1104 (Del. 1991); Culver v. Bennett, 588 A.2d 1094, 1096 (Del. 1991); Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278, 1282 (Del. 1991); Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719, 724 (Del. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1223 (1991); Dawson v. State, 581 A.2d 1078, 1105 (Del. 1990), vacated on other grounds, remanded, 503 U.S. 159 (1992); Probst v. State, 547 A.2d 114, 120 (Del. 1988); Sheeran v. State, 526 A.2d 886, 894 (Del. 1987); Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d 581, 596 (Del. 1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987); Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 128 (Del. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983) and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985); Haas v. United Technologies Corp., 450 A.2d 1173, 1179 (Del. 1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1192 (1983); Storey v. Castner, 314 A.2d 187, 194 (Del. 1973); Baker v. Reid, 57 A.2d 103, 109 (Del. 1947).
14. Massey v. State, 953 A.2d 210, 216 (Del. 2008); Spencer v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 930 A.2d 881, 886 (Del. 2007); Manley v. State, 918 A.2d 321, 326 (Del.), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 971 (2007); Corbett v. Tatagari, 804 A.2d 1057, 1062 (Del. 2002); Sirmans v. Penn, 588 A.2d 1103, 1104 (Del. 1991); Claudio v. State, 585 A.2d 1278, 1283 (Del. 1991); Sanders v. State, 585 A.2d 117, 131 (Del. 1990); Sheeran v. State, 526 A.2d 886, 894 (Del. 1987); Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d 581, 596 (Del. 1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987); Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 128 (Del. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983) and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985); Haas v. United Technologies Corp., 450 A.2d 1173 1179 (Del. 1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1192 (1983); Jenkins v. State, 305 A.2d 610, 617 (Del. 1973); House v. Lauritzen, 237 A.2d 134, 136 (Del. 1967); Cloud v. State, 154 A.2d 680, 683, 78 A.L.R.2d 294 (Del. 1959); Buckley v. R. H. Johnson & Co., 25 A.2d 392, 400 (Del. Super. 1942); Greenplate v. Lowth, 199 A. 659, 665 (Del. Super. 1938); Spahn v. People’s R. Co., 92 A. 727, 729 (Del. Super. 1912).
15. Stuart v. R.izzo, 242 A.2d 477, 478 (Del. 1968).
16. Hyman Reiver & Co. v. Merlonghi, 236 A.2d 367, 368 (Del. 1967).
17. Buckley v. R. H. Johnson & Co., 25 A.2d 392, 398 (Del. Super. 1942).
18. House v. Lauritzen, 237 A.2d 134, 136 (Del. 1967).
19. Probst v. State, 547 A.2d 114, 120 (Del. 1988).
© 2010 David L. Finger